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MORAL RULES AND EXCEPTIONS
MIROSLAV M.KIS
Andrews University

In a moral system, rules are often confronted by exceptions. In
fact, an exception presupposes the existence of a rule, for lcjgical
necessity calls for a context of requirement before one can speak
meaningfully about an exception. But the reverse statement, that a
rule presupposes an exception, is more problematic. Christian
ethical theorists have long struggled with this latter proposition
and with related questions. Can rules and exceptions, for instance,
coexist in some sort of friendly competition? Or are they mutually
exclusive? And is there a possibility of having "exceptionless"
moral rules?
The task of this essay, which explores this basic area of ethical
concern, is twofold. First, I look at moral discourse from the angle
of the relation between moral rules and their exceptions. In this
connection I suggest four possible alternative relations between the
two. My purpose is not to discover one best relationship, but rather
to identify conditions as well as reasons for setting up exceptions
and for accepting or rejecting the use of them.
Second, I provide rationale for the thesis that the admission of,
and resistance to, exceptions has an impact (good or bad) on the
rule, at least on the level of the attitude of the moral agent. L. G.
Miller indicates that rules are not affected by exceptions inasmuch
as exceptions are not directed at rules but rather at moral
judgments.' However, if moral judgments are affected, the result
with respect to rules is very significant indeed, since moral rules
and moral judgments can be kept completely separated only in
theory, not in factual reality and practice.
'L. G. Miller, "Rules and Exceptions,"Ethics 46 (July, 1956): 269.

1. Some Preliminary Considerations

Before we consider alternative answers to our basis query, a
few preliminary considerations are in order. First of all I define my
use of the terms "rules" and '"moral rules." Next I deal with the
contrast between "exceptions"and "excuses." And then, as the final
preliminary consideration, I describe the dynamic and relationships
that are involved in connection with rules and exceptions to them.

Moral Rules
In ethical literature the term "rule" is used in a variety of
ways. It sometimes signifies a general and generic category in
distinction from, but also often inclusive of, such more limited or
specific concepts as "action," "value," "ends," etc. When ethicists
speak of rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism or of rule ethics
versus situation ethics, the word "rule" includes all rules, whether
these are general principles or whether they are specific rules of
action.
On the other hand, the word "rule" may have reference to
something very specific, as when it signifies a direct and specific
requirement which enjoins more-or-less concrete action or inaction.
In this case, a "rule" is a subspecies of a "principle" or "norm." It is
what Paul Ramsey calls a "direct rule," or "defined-action rules"
belonging to the more general "defined-action principle1? In the
present essay, I use the term "moral rule" in the sense of the direct
rule that enjoins a specific and concrete action.
Infrequent use and a somewhat ambiguous understanding of
the word "exception"necessitates some clarification of this word as
well. In general terms, an "exception" is defined as an instance or
a judgment that does not conform to an established rule. It is "a
particular case which comes within the terms of a rule, but to
which the rule is not applicable.'"

"Exceptions" and "Excuses"
Some distinctions between "exceptions" and "excuses"may also
prove helpful here. Whereas an "exception" refers to a rule in the
'Paul Ramsey and G. H. Outka, eds., 'The Case of the Curious Exception,"
Norm and Context in Christian Ethics (New York: Scribner, 1969), 93.

'The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 3:373.
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context of a moral judgment, decision, or dilemma, the most
frequent antecedent for "excuse" is a specific action. If nothing is
done, no excuses are in order. In fact, to seek for excuses at the
level of decision-making or in confrontation with dilemmas prior
to the consummation of an act is to open one's motives to
suspicion. In other words, if I think of excuses before I act, this
very fact may indicate my knowledge of the blameworthiness of
the course of action I contemplate taking, and my desire to perform
the act without being blamed. In short, excuses presuppose an
ascription of responsibility.'
Moreover, whereas the opposite of an exception is conformity,
the opposite of an excuse is an accusation. If I am accused for
having done action A, my alternatives are: (a) to admit having
done the action, taking the consequences; (b) to deny the action; or
(c) to seek excuses for the action. Alternative "(a)" is the opposite
of alternative "(c)," for by admission of the action I do not seek to
avoid the blame and consequences that are inherent in the
accusation. The best solution here is simply to ask for forgiveness.
By doing it, I do not need to put forth an excuse or even to present
attenuating evidences; rather, I rest my case on mercy and
compassion. With denial (alternative "b") on the other hand, I seek
to show that the accusation itself is a mistake. This also contrasts
with alternative "c," for when I resort to excuses I do not deny
having done action A. Instead, I either (i) seek to justify the action
and thus dismiss the blame, or (ii) plead for mitigation of
responsibility on the basis of extenuating circumstances and thus
diminish or even totally deny the blame.
The call for an exception differs from all the above. When
asking for it, not only do I admit the action which appears to
conflict with the rule but prior to my taking that action also claim
to have insights, arguments, and/or evidences on the basis of
which I should be allowed either to circumvent the requirement of
the rule or to modify the rule so as to fit my own unique case. In
using this procedure, I assume responsibility for the action and for
its consequences.
4For helpful treatise on excuses, see David Holdcroft, "A Plea for Excuses,"
Philosophy 44 (Od. 1969):314-330.

The Dynamic of Conformity and Nonconfomity
In the case of conformity to the rule, the responsibility for my
action and for my status is not entirely mine. My situation rests on
the authority standing behind the requirement. In view of this
(1) the validity and trustworthiness of that authority is tested every
time an action is performed in conformity to the rule, with future
obedience also being either encouraged or discouraged; (2) my
loyalty and the manner in which I conform become exposed to
scrutiny; and (3) the validity and relevancy of the rule are put to
trial, as well. If there are some features present or absent during
my action, or as a consequence of it, these features indicate a flaw
in either (I), (2), or (3), which may cause me to doubt the goodness
or rightness of my action. Such features, insights, and/or evidences
will alert me to a need for "exceptions to the rule" in my future
behavior, or to the necessity for improving my moral reasoning, or
to the need for rejecting the rule itself.
Looking back at my action or my decision, I may choose to do
nothing about my future conduct and simply rely on excuses. I
would adopt the alternative (c) mentioned earlier, suppress the
warnings, and resign myself to the rule (or its authority) without
questioning. The danger I face with (c) is that (i) or (ii)-namely,
seeking justification for the action, or pleading mitigation of
responsibility for the action--could turn out to be merely an act of
cowardice which stifles moral growth. If I opt for (a), the door is
open for improvement, growth, and perhaps brave failures. If
careful analysis of both (1) and ( 2 t t h e validity and trustworthiness of the authority behind the rule, and my own loyalty
and manner of conformity to the rule-inspires confidence, the
validity or relevancy of option (3) must be tested, for exceptions
might be in order. Unlike the search for excuses, the endeavor to
establish an exception may prove extremely challenging and
helpful. Several factors could complicate my assignment, however.
Among them are the consequences of modification, extreme
hardship, threat to life, extreme conflict or ambiguity of norms with
regard to them, my personal convictions or special theological
insights, covenants, etc.
2. Concepts Involved in the Call for Exceptions

Some further pertinent concepts involved in a call for
exceptions should be noted:
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1. An exception always refers to a rule that applies to the
particular case. If a rule does not apply, what is needed is not an
exception, but rather another rule.
2. Exceptions are sometimes called on the basis of some
exempting conditions external to the rule? For instance, a rule which
enjoins returning what is borrowed may be excepted if the
borrower should suffer sudden tragedy and therefore is in no
condition to return the borrowed item now or ever. The tragedy
could not be anticipated and for that reason is outside of the rule.
Thus it may be considered as a condition justifying an exception.
3. At times exceptions are justified by so-called qualifying
conditions In this case, qualifying conditions claim the power to
produce modifications, enlargements, and perhaps enrichment of
the original rule. For example, the rule which prohibits taking
produce from my garden without my permission (this would be an
act of stealing) can be modified under certain conditions. If my
neighbor needs to feed her hungry family, and there are no other
options other than to take some of my tomatoes, she may choose
to help herself without telling me. As the owner of the produces,
I have several options in such a case. I can prosecute this neighbor
(the option is legally justified). Or I can interpret her poverty as an
exempting condition and tolerate her act. Or, finally, I can come to
realize my own failure to know of, or be sensitive to, my
neighbor's destitution (and possibly to the needs of many other
neighbors); thus modifying my rule of action by saying, "Do not
steal my tomatoes, unless you must feed your hungry children";
thus the concept of Christian stewardshipand obedience to the law
of loving one's neighbor may urge me to justify an exception to the
rule. The basic purpose of the rule has remained, but its meaning
has been enriched?
Moral situations are, however, never simple. Although an
owner may call exception to the rule protecting his or her property,
a neady neighbor should take care not to assume overly much.
Stealing is, of course, a forgivable action, but a request or
explanation may gain access to much more than a few tomatoes,
and may do so at a lesser risk for all concerned. We may note in
passing, that in this procedure the call for exceptions may at times
5Ramseyand Outka, 87.

%id.
'bid., 89.

stave off more difficult, but also more responsible, alternatives of
action. In other words, in view of exempting conditions, it may be
easier to take what is not mine and simply expecting the owner to
be tolerant than to communicate the conditions and thus act with
mutual agreement.
4. At least one more reason for exceptions is often presented.
Paul Ramsey calls it "faithfulnessclnims.'* It is evident that a moral
agent brings such claims into the moral decision. We all have our
promises to keep and thus our God, our family, and our neighbors
have laid claims on us. These claims can serve as the basis for a
call for exceptions. For instance, it is conceivable that during World
War I1 some military guards resisted even seemingly innocent
gestures towards female prisoners of war due to the claims of their
marriage covenant or to the requirements of the military code. The
same would be true in the reverse direction too, of course, and
undoubtedly in many other similar situations as well.
3. The Relationship between Rule and Exception

We are now ready to turn our attention to the alternative
answers that may be given to our original questions concerning the
relationship between rule and exception, and concerning the status
of a rule which admits an exception. In exploring such answers, we
must take note of the fact that it is possible to group the use of
exceptions in moral decisions into four categories. These are:
(A) exclusion of the rule, (B) exceptions in the rule, (C) exceptions
to the rule, and (D)exclusion of exceptions.

A. Exclusion of the Rule
There are views which hold that exceptions are not made to
a rule, but rather that rules themselves should be excepted. This,
of course, poses a challenge to my earlier statement to the effect
that an exception presupposes a rule.
The existentialist approach, for instance, avoids rules as a basis
for moral conduct. Instead, human creativity, freedom, and
resourcefulness are trusted to inspire the moral agent, revealing the
specific need in the situation and thus orienting the decision. In
this approach, conformity to a rule is viewed as an inferior stance
because it looks back at the rule for orientation. As C. Michalson
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points out: 'The future is a more reliable guide simply because it
does not tell us what to do, but appeals to us to invent or create in
the light of the emerging situation.'" Thus, D. Bonhoeffer could
say that a Christian should not be fettered by principle because,
bound by the love of God, the Christian has been set free from the
problems and conflicts of ethical decisions. The emphasis in the
foregoing is obviously on the uniqueness of each individual and
each situation. As a consequence, not one single rule can be found
to prescribe or predict the direction or decision.
The situationalism of Joseph Fletcher is not far, either, from
this attitude towards rules. Although situationalists claim an
unexceptionable norm as a foundation for their system, they deem
that a&@ love is this absolute norm, whose task it is to correct
legalism in ethics. Yet, while Joseph Fletcher carefully separates
agap from sentimentalism and partiality,'' the very absoluteness
of this love as a single matchless norm opens opportunities for
exceptions. Agap is inevitably both general in nature and remote
from the rule of action, and thus it becomes very flexible as a
norm.
Two additional principles are utilized in justifying the call for
exceptions in situationalism, and these bring it closer to the
existentialist camp. The first declares that love's decision is made
situationally, not prescriptively." Fletcher believes that in the heat
of the situation the fears, pressures, hopes, guilts, and limitations
will not cloud the mind of the moral agent. We can wonder
whether the absence of particular commitments to some foreseeable
sort of action in a foreseeable kind of situation would not provide
a more secure and consistent moral conduct.
The main problem with this is that love itself may be
excepted. On the other hand, as experience seems to show, when
love becomes a commitment in terms of action, when it is
safeguarded within specific covenants of relationship with God and
humans, then the risk of love itself being excepted is greatly
reduced. In this case, the action born out of a love which has
planned ahead provides a firmer ground, especially if the situation
takes the form of temptation.
9C. Michalson, "Existentialist Ethics," in Westminster Dictionary of Christian
Ethics, ed. J. F. Childers and J. MacQuarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 218.

''Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics: the Nau Morality (Philadelphia:Westminster,
1966)) 113.

The second principle is exemplified by Fletcher's urging us to
let love justify an~thing.'~
This brings in another set of problems,
for means must be considered even when love is the end of an
action. In his excellent critique of Fletcher's point in this regard,
Paul Ramsey shows that there are other criteria for justifying the
means besides their usefulness in achieving ends. For example,
means must conform to natural rights or natural justice. Cruel
forms of punishment must never be used for the sake of any end,
no matter how good that end.'3 He warns that the price paid by
consequentialism is "the reduction of the moral life and the very
humanum of men to the possibility of being used as instruments
only."'4
It is this reduction of humanness, of relationships, and of
covenants to mere instrumentalism that threatens agapz and ushers
in exceptions. Unarmed, uncommitted, and unprepared in terms of
a particular action of love, the moral agent is totally absorbed and
fascinated by the end, often forgetting the means to that end. The
rules which safeguard marriage or property rights, for example,
may then be excepted if an end requires it. Any rule or any right
is a potential candidate for being overruled and replaced by an
exception. The example of the rule regulating marriage and divorce
as interpreted by the school of Hillel is a possible illustration of
this approach to exceptions. In this interpretation, the rule of
fidelity could be set aside by the husband for even trivial reasons,
so that in effect it was mot the rule that guided, but rather that
exceptions regulated the conduct.
B. Exceptions in the Rule
In distinction from the previous position, which hesitates to
prescribe moral conduct, the approach of "exceptions within the
Rule" gives rules a more fundamental role. The relationship
between rule and exception is not that of dominance of one over
the other, but rather that of synthesis that is to say, the exception
modifies, alters, broadens, or enriches the rule.
The first concern in this case is what to do with qualifying
conditions. Extreme hardship (such as suffering), direct conflict of

I3Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics (New York: University
Press of America,1983), 185.
"Ibid.
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norms or values, utility, pima farie conviction that one's duty to
God and man stand at variance with the usual conformity to a
particular rule, and so on, may create a dilemma. As stated by
L. G. Miller, "If it is the case that each rule is usually to be
followed but not always and that there is no way of telling when
the questions about exceptions will arise and how they are to be
resolved, then morality itself is left in a rather disorganized and
confused state."15
In order to bring coherence to ethical theory, a utilitarian
suggests the prioritization of rules. If rule X normally applies and
is now faced with qualifying conditions which generate exception
Y, the first thing to do is to calculate which of the two--either X or
XY-would result in the greatest good. If tomorrow rule X meets
exception Z, then "calculus" must decide whether either X, XY, or
XZ or even XYZ would bring the greatest good. Thus we end up
with a hierarchy of rules that are all subordinated to and ranked
by the general criterion of utility. The original rule X is modified
or supplemented by rules XY, XZ,or XYZ.
In such a situation the moral agent is faced with several
challenges. For example, on what basis is a person to know
whether X or XY will produce the greatest amount of good? How
do we identify priority among such "good" things as intellectual
development, spiritual growth, one's duty to keep promises, etc.?
The criterion of utility is too vague and also too vulnerable to
human finiteness and weakness to give it endorsement. In addition
to that, as L. G. Miller reminds us, it is just not the case that where
there are two rules one will always take precedence over the
other?
Finally, how do we stop exceptions from recurring? If Y is the
exception to X and if Y refers to some qualifying conditions (like
suffering), Y can have its own exception, and this in turn can have
its own, and so on ad infiniturn.
H. Sidwick suggests that the solution to the problem of everemerging exceptions can be resolved by listing all possible future
exceptions." But how can we decide upon these, and how do we
know that we have constructed a complete list? Without a new

"H. Sidwick, The Methods 4 Ethics (London: Macmillan, l884), 311.

criterion, the criterion of completeness, no one can be sure that any
rule will remain secure and reliable.
Furthermore, even an exhaustive listing of exceptions, were it
possible, would neither provide an infallible criterion of ranking
nor produce a series of rules. At best, what it would produce is a
conjunction of rules. Such a conjunction or "joint assertion of a
number of rules will not be a rule that can be used to resolve
conflicts between the component rule^.'"^
Utilitarianism with calculus and the utility criteria, together
with prima facie principle, and other forms of hierarchialism
wherein the rules are ranked as amended by exception, cast doubts
on the reliability of the rule in its synthetic relations with
exceptions." Solutions of this kind, even if inevitable, are not
always reliable. We cannot always determine whether our original
rule retains enough of its originality so as not to overly alter its
applications and consequences, or whether the rule is modified to
the extent that it becomes in reality another rule alongside the
original one, perhaps even taking the front seat.
Another way of limiting the proliferation of exceptions is to
confine them to a family of rules. If X is the basic original rule of
action and if exception y is applied to it, then we endeavor to limit
the exception's influence only to Xy and not XY. If exception z is
applied, the result is Xz.In that case, Xy and Xz are different rules,
but both of them belong to the same genus x?' In this construct,
modification of the rule is only partial, and only those exceptions
are admitted which relate to that particular rule of action. And yet,
even in this case we have no way of knowing whether we can
predict or list all exceptions exhaustively, nor do we know how or
why to prefer y to z.
The difficulties of synthesis between rules and exceptions are
reduced when qualifying conditions can be predicted with
regularity. The case of the law concerning divorce as interpreted by
the school of Shammai serves as an illustration. It is possible to
affirm the rule of faithfulness to marriage vows and at the same
time encompass the qualifying condition of "unchastity." The rule,
then, is conditionally binding because unchastity is ipso facto a

I9For further insights, see Miller's article.

%.J .Erickson, Relativism in Contempwary Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker, 1974), 140.
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justification for exception. The concept of faithfulness implies this
caveat.
But why should this be so? One might imagine that unchastity
might be encouraged or even somehow caused by the "innocent"
partner. Should we then be more careful so as to say that even
when an exception of this kind is present, divorce is conditional on
the total innocence of the other marriage partner? Here again we
discover that the old problem of recurring exceptions emerges. The
original rule is open to modification by means of exceptions, and
thus that rule becomes conditionally binding, modified by everrecurring exceptions.

C. Exceptions to the Rule
Many Christians believe that human life, moral life included,
stands within the authority of God. His will for humans is the very
definition of moral good and moral duty. "He has shown you, 0
man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you"
(Mic 6:s).This "showing" of the moral good and moral duty occurs
primarily in Scripture. The words of wisdom (Proverbs,
Ecclesiastes), of advice (Deut 30:15-29, Mat 5-7), of special
commands (Isa 1:ll-18, Eph 5:25-32, Exod 20:l-17), and of examples
(Heb 11:l-39,12:1-I), all show God's will for human moral conduct.
The most reliable and clear revelation of moral good and moral
duty is revealed in the life of Jesus Christ (1Pet 2:21-25, John
13:l-17, Phil 2:5-11).
The effort of God's love to meet the human need for moral
guidance motivates Christians to follow God's will gladly. As a
result, God's wish or will becomes a rule for the Christian, and that
rule enjoys preeminence over exceptions. Moral rules thus are not
subject to abrogation or modification by an exception.
Some characteristic features of this third alternative way of
relating exceptions to rules should be noted:
1. Exceptions are Accidental. True exceptions to a rule cannot be
predicted nor regulated. A predictable exception (if in harmony
with God's will) is just another rule. Even the exempting condition
of unchastity in marriage is not a predictable event, otherwise no
Christian would enter into a marriage covenant where adultery is
foreseeable. And when it does occur, it should not be an ipso facto
justification for the exception, i.e. divorce. Repentance and
forgiveness can save the marriage, and the commitment to the

covenant of faithfulness is affirmed above the exception. Moreover,
each exception must be decided at face value in every case.
2. Exceptions are Unique. M. J . Erickson states that there "is
something about the particular case under consideration that lifts
it above the general rule. The case itself is so unique, however, that
the exception-making rule cannot be generalized or extended to
other cases. It applies to this case, and to it al~ne."~'
"Thou shalt not kill" is a rule which calls for respect for
human life. It is also an expression of God's will. In 1 Sam 15:3,
however, the same God gives another command. This time his will
is that the Israelites kill the Amalekites. Herein the decalogue
commandment prohibiting murder seems to be modified so as to
include this exception.
There are, however, two other possibilities. Keeping in mind
that the command to kill the Amalekites is "accidental" (that is, no
one could have predicted nor expected such an order), we may
consider that this command becomes separate from the decalogue
commandment. It stands, not on the authority or validity of the
decalogue commandment, but rather on God's expressed order.
Thus, there is no relationship between the two commands, either
contradictory or complementary.
A second point of view would be to consider the command to
kill the Amalekites as a unique command. It concerns this one
situation and time, and it is given to Israel alone. The requirement
is unique and very specific, and therefore it is an exception to the
decalogue commandment.
But if an exception must be so focused, specific, and accidental
in order to qualify as an exception, how is it still an exception to
the rule in question? Why not simply consider it as a totally new
rule? Looking further at the characteristics of exceptions may
provide an answer.
3. Both the Rule and the Exception Refer to Some Related Value.
Two rules which regulate two unrelated values cannot establish an
exceptional relation. The sixth commandment and the command to
kill the Amalekites both refer to the same value of human life, but
they demand contrary actions. Recognition of one of the rules as
specific and relative to a unique circumstance resolves the conflict
and safeguards the proper validity of both requirements. The
specific rule becomes an exception to the general rule whose
function is to regulate the usual relation to that value.
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4 . One of the Rules Should be a General Rule. Two specific and
unique rules do not usually establish an exceptional relation. The
order to kill the Amalekites is not an exception, nor is it related, for
instance, to the command not to kill Cain (Gen 4:15). The two
commands are very specific and both of them can independently
entertain an exception or be related to a more general rule.
5. The Rule and its Exception Proceed from the Same Authority. In
the case of two requirements if one of them is according to divine
will and the other comes from society or some other human
authority, no call for exceptions is possible. The obligation to God
takes precedence over one's duty to human beings (Acts 4:19),
because the Christian's best behavior in inter-human relationships
is contained in the will of God.
6. Exceptions Require Extraordinary Situations. Sin and its tragic
consequence of evil often bring overwhelming challenges to human
will, faith, wisdom, and commitments. These are circumstances of
conflicting ultimates (life-boat), or times when conformity requires
non-existing resources (as in the advanced pregnancy of a young
incest victim), to mention just a few. If an exception to the rule is
introduced, it will be because, humanly speaking, this is the
very last alternative. Rules in this approach are "virtually
exceptionless.'"
This approach must deal with several problems. For example,
the moral agent is faced with uncertainty as to when the personal
plight is extraordinary enough to justify an exception. God's will
often leads human lives through unusual hardships. Was not this
Job's experience? His wife and his friends judged his condition
more than sufficiently tragic to require an exception.
But, is the counsel of humans an adequate guide in moral
matters? Some churches provide dogmas, canons, and even
authoritative advice which indicate when and if an exception is
warranted. If the church is perceived as God's infallible
mouthpiece, such a solution makes sense. Yet, Job remained in
agony in spite of the input he received. We see him stand as an
individual responsible for his decisions and actions; the human
input can only advise and react, it cannot decide for others.
Experience seems to show that the extremity of a tragedy is a
very hostile context for prescriptivism. Heroism and extraordinary
courage defy requirement. Christians who relate rules and
%chard Gula, What Are They Saying about Moral Noms? (NewYork: Paulist
Press, 1982), 77-79.

exceptions according to approach #3 must deal with the uncertainty
of knowing when an exception is warranted, and this is in part
what human freedom and responsibility mean.
The danger, of course, is to consider only what is possible as
required, what is unpleasant as exceptional, and what is
challenging as unique. The threat of a "slippery slope" is a constant
reality as soon as one tolerates exceptions.

D. The Exclusion of Exceptiuns
We finally turn our attention to a fourth way of relating rules
to exceptions. Here, conformity to rules is so rigorous that it
excludes all exceptions in every circumstance and at any place or
time. This approach is based on several presuppositions.
First of all, God is sovereign. The Scriptures teach that no
other authority can successfully challenge his authority, no wisdom
or power can equal his wisdom and power, and no will should
take precedence over his will (Isa 40~26).The extremity of moral
hardship cannot outdistance him, nor can the uniqueness of a
moral dilemma surprise him to the point where humans must go
it alone and claim exceptions.
Second, God's will is perfectly good for humans; exceptions
can add nothing good. Any system of ethics that presents a notion
of good outside of the divine will as expressed in God's grace
towards human beings "coincides exactly with the conception of
sin. . . . "23 There can be no question of a positive recognition of
Christian ethics by other systems or of an attachment of Christian
ethics to them, because Christian ethics stands under the "final
word of the original chairman.'"
A third postulate affirms that God has claimed all human life.
"No one has a claim on a man, or on a people, save God alone, and
this claim permeates all relationships of life. It is the only valid
norm." God and man are bound by a mutual covenant and for that
reason their actions must reflect mutual loyalty?
But obedience, it is claimed, is not a natural response to God's
will. Since man wants above all to be like God, his way is "the warpath on which he has entered in opposition to God. Between God,
=Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics (Edinburgh:T & T Clark, 1957), vol. 2, part 2,
518.
25EmilBnmner, The Divine Imperatiae (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1937), 54.
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the eternally good, and man, the relationship might easily be one
of scorn on the part of God and envy on the part of man. But it
cannot be one of claim on the part of God and obedience on the
part of man." 26 Obedience which does not come from divine
grace will certainly fail and seek for exceptions in order to
accommodate human weakness.
Therefore, obedience is not a matter of preference, choice, or
convenience, rather, it is a matter of faith? It is a response "to the
God in whom we may believe;" God "who calls us in such a way
that we must not only hear, but obey; who orders us in such a way
that in all freedom we must recognize the force of His order

....1128

The fourth postulate is that God's command is both urgent
and stringent. It is urgent because it is the precondition of life
itself.z9Humans cannot be indifferent to it without jeopardizing
their destiny. It is stringent because, being above man's spiritual
life and beyond the realization of human reason or achievement, it
gives no room for maneuvering?' Human action can be either that
of obedience or disobedience. The decision of good and evil has
been settled once and for all in the decree of God, in the cross and
resurrection of Jesus Christ." By that divine choice, all human
choices must be measured. "What right conduct is for man is
determined absolutely in the right conduct of God."32 Christians
cannot change it, nor should they go back on it and seek
exceptions.
The fifth premise concerns the nature of moral obligation.
Barth insists that humans are destined to obedience to God's
command of grace. Therefore, humans should not endeavor to give
an answer to the moral question of what is good and what is right,
but rather they are called to be that answer. The multifarious
systems of ethics which seek to give answers to moral dilemmas are
just a prolongation of our fallenness, because they presuppose the

"Karl Barth, Ethics (New York: Seabury Press, 1981),102.

2sBarth,Church Dogmatics, 556.

"bid., 536.
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possibility of an abstract and external knowledge of good and
right. For Barth, obligation proceeds from a concrete divine
command which confronts the moral agent directly. It is the work
of sanctifying grace in Christ Jesus. Following Jesus, a Christian
does not crave good conduct of and for himself or herself, but
rather seeks to be the subject to God's grace, will, and command.33
Here we touch a critical point of this approach to exceptions.
Two questions are: How do we apprehend the command? And
how do we know it is a divine command that we are considering?
A personal encounter with God who confronts us is Barth's answer
to the first question. The sense of obligation, the choice of action,
the motivation for acting on that choice happen in the intimacy of
the human self. External prescriptions are only relative orientations even if they are found in the Bible. "Obviously neither the
totality nor a selection of the biblical imperatives, nor any one of
them is in itself the unconditioned concrete command that comes
to you and me today." This is true for the Ten Commandments,
Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, "or imperatives of the admonitory
chapters of the epistles.''35
But how do we discern between divine voice and the urges
stemming from our human heart? Carl F. H. Henry argues that
Barth's rejection of general revelation and the Bible as propositional
communication of divine will opens the door for subjectivism and
relativism? He advocates a Christian ethic that comes from
objectively revealed proposition^:^ in addition to the ministry of
the Holy Spirit.)' Such propositions are known rationally as the
divine "ought" which encompasses human moral life and gives it
specific and practical dire~tion?~
In this way the danger of the
subjectivist's vulnerability to exceptions is averted.
It must be admitted, however, that either on the basis of direct
divine encounter or by the mediation of rational revelation to
human reason and will, the exception of all exceptions remains a
%id., 517.
"Ibid., 556,557.
35Barth,Ethics, 81/82.

Tar1 F. H. Henry, Christian Persom2 Ethics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1973,196.
37~bid.,
257.
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challenge for Christian moral life. If the former carries the threat of
subjectivism, the latter is haunted by fallible human reason and by
corrupted human will. To be a Christian means to listen, discern,
search, and follow. It means to be watchful of assuming too much
and believing too little. Discipleship is costly, as Bonhoeffer
demonstrated. Total commitment and loyalty to God's will cannot
be legislated, earned, or experienced passively. Exceptionless,
loving conformity is the promise given by the One who is well able
to bring it to completion.
4 . Conclusion

The four approaches of relating exceptions to moral rules
suggested here represent only four foci in the spectrum of
alternatives. It is possible and even necessary to consider all
available factors in order to create the most circumspect response
to a moral requirement (either a rule or its exception).Identification
and evaluation of conditions and reasons for opting for or against
a rule or its exception is a necessary part of this process.
In approach 1, the conditions which foster exceptions are
human creativity, autonomy, freedom, relativity to the situation,
and the ends sought. The reasons for calling for exceptions are the
radical uniqueness of each situation and each individual, along
with fear of legalism, together with rejection of it.
Approach 2 views extreme hardship, conflict of norms and
values, utility, and prim facie duties as some conditions under
which exceptions may arise. One of the main reasons for excepting
a rule may be the concept of the greatest good for the greatest
number of persons, as in utilitarianism.
In approach 3, exceptions are admitted only under the most
stringent, singularly unique, and unpredictably new conditions.
Therefore, it is hard to identify any consistent reason which could
always justify an exception to a rule.
Finally, approach 4 admits no conditions for exception. The
basic reason for this absolute exclusion of exceptions is found in
the origin and nature of moral rules. The origin of moral rules is
in the perfectly good will of a sovereign God who has claim on all
of human life. In this context, moral rules are both urgent and
stringent in nature. They compel the moral agent to be the answer
to the question of what is good and morally right.
The foregoing survey of the various rule-exceptioncorrelations
seems to confirm the claim that the concept of moral exceptions
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varies with the way in which moral rules are viewed. In
approaches 1 and 2, moral rules are either rejected or given a
relative or conditional validity. It is here that exceptions enjoy
legitimacy. In approach 3, on the other hand, as the concept of
moral rules enjoys greater authority and universality, not only are
exceptions more uncommon, they become more unusual and
extraordinary.
Furthermore, it appears that not all exceptions are conceived
as identical. In approaches 1 and 2, exceptions may come
dangerously close to being excuses. This is the case because the
principle of utility and situational decision-making without any
prior preparation and commitment proves too weak for affirming
and maintaining the validity of a rule. As shown above in
approach 3, exceptions are unusual and very extraordinary.
All of this leads us to raise the question as to whether the
admission of any exception (particularlyif exception borders on the
notion of excuse) leaves rules intact. Is not the introduction of an
exception into moral discourse as significant as is the affirmation
of a rule? Why would a moral rule be affected less by introduction
of an exception than an exception would be weakened through
affirmation of a rule?
It appears that a rule which repeatedly resists an exception
and an exception which persists against a rule become dominant at
least on the level of the moral agent's attitude. I can see at least
two reasons for this. First, human behavior is habit-forming.
Resistance to something strengthens resistance, and compliance
makes future compliance easier. Second, the moral conduct is open
to influence and prompting from the outside. So, for example, the
affirmation of the rule of loyalty to one's belief by John Huss
(contrary to approach 1) in the face of extreme hardship (in
divergence from approach 2), even if his case could be classified as
singularly unique and thus justify an exception (approach 3), has
inspired many to affirm the same rule. On the other hand, the
denial by Jerome of Prague on September 11,1415, had an opposite
impact on Christians that was not fully overcome by Jerome's
affirmation of loyalty at the price of martyrdom one year later.
Finally, we should be reluctant to declare where any
individual stands on the rule-exception issue. An attempt to define
this displays either ignorance or arrogance or both. Only God can
accurately judge performance and preference. Sometimes in our
attempt to elaborate a classification of moral conduct or moral
reasoning with the purpose of bringing a better understanding of
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that conduct and reasoning, we succumb to a temptation to classify
people. James Gustafson has shown how extremely difficult and
needless such an activity really is?
For instance, it is not necessarily true that approaches 1 and
4 stand in mutual contradiction. It is possible to believe that a
perfect Moral Agent brings them together. If God's will (including revealed propositional scriptural statements) is internalized
(Ps 40:9) so that autonomy and theonomy coincide perfectly, then
no exceptions are needed or possible. Short of this, loving and
exceptionless conformity to God's will is a promise realized only
in Jesus Christ and through his grace realizable in us (Phil 1:6).
'('JamesGustafson, "ContextVersus Principle, a Misplaced Debate in Christian
Ethics," Hamard Theological Rmiew 58 (1965): 171-202.

